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Few terms have evoked the range of responses, or been quite so used, and abused, as the term 
‘globalization’. It has been variously described as a process, a period, a force and a condition. 
The resulting ascriptions and attributions are diverse and invariably invite confusion. There 
are those who would enthusiastically argue for globalization’s merits, setting it up as panacea 
to all the ills of contemporary political, economic and social organisation. Others argue 
equally vociferously and convincingly that it has done more harm than good, exacerbating 
and entrenching inequalities. For still others, there is no point in arguing for or against 
globalization; ‘progress’ (and by implication the neoliberal logic) inexorably leads us into 
more intensely global settings, and we must either adapt to it and move forward, or be left to 
languish by the wayside.  
Even though the term globalization is used liberally in political rhetoric and in the 
press, its meaning is somehow assumed to be intuitively known; it is rarely spelt out. Indeed, 
‘globalisation’ is often the term being explained and the explanation itself. In contrast, the 
academic literature offers an amazing variety of different theories and definitions, with 
almost every researcher in the social sciences having something to add to the ongoing debates 
and discussions. However, here again, nothing about globalization is uncontested -- there is 
little consensus on what globalization actually is, what drives it, whether it is a qualitatively 
new phenomenon, and whether it is a primarily beneficial or damaging process. Some define 
it as the development of a global society, characterized by the denationalization of markets, 
politics and legal systems. Other scholars tend to focus on the ‘symptoms’ of globalization, 
such as transnational migration, global cultural flows or external environmental effects. 
Globalization’s critics regard it as something of a myth, created by the neoliberal school in 
order to spread capitalism around the globe, divert attention from the suppression of local 
cultures, and to eventually effect the ‘Americanization’ of the international political 
economy. Yet, also visible around the world is a greater involvement in grass roots 
organisations and movements, regionalism, and efforts for greater local autonomy, making 
any universal statement about globalisation, let alone its effects, quite untenable. 
This introduction will draw out some of the key trajectories of thinking on 
globalization, highlighting the complex nature of the subject, and offering a framework for 
navigating through the rest of the volume. It flags up some of the usages that dominate 
academic and non-academic discourses, applied to various dimensions of economic, political, 
social, environmental, technological and cultural transformations. We begin by asking 
whether there is something substantively new about globalisation – a discussion that leads on 
to the etymology of the term ‘globalisation’ and the evolution of its finer nuances and 
contemporary connotations. Following from there, this introduction seeks to understand some 
of the ways in which globalisation is currently theorised, looking at what globalization is seen 
to be doing in its economic, political, cultural and social incarnations. Thus, the following 
sections look at the globalist arguments for the triumph of the market and the end of the 
nation-state; the challenges posed by deterritorialisation, including the perceived threats of 
cultural homogenisation; to finally conclude by askind whether globalization is ‘good’ or 
‘bad’. Posing this question is necessary in so far as most of the arguments for or against 
globalization look at its perceived effects or outcomes. As will be seen, it is equally important 
to understand where, or from which positionality, these arguments are coming from, as these 
in turn determine particular understandings of globalization and arguments for or against it.  
 
Globalization – Old or New? 
 
There is nothing intrinsically new about philosophical ideas about global interconnectedness 
or economic interdependencies, trade in commodities, or intellectual and cultural exchange. 
From the sixteenth century onwards, European colonization and industrialization established 
the foundations of the contemporary global political economy. Marxist scholars, for instance, 
have long argued that contemporary globalization is simply a more advanced stage in this 
process – the latest stage in the development of capitalism, itself a product of historical 
evolution. Capitalism, or the exploitation of the many by the few, Marxists would argue, is 
built on the back of the industrial revolution and the subsequent European imperialism of the 
19th and early 20th century, which has created the contemporary division of the global 
political economy into a developed Global North and an underdeveloped Global South.  
Many a writer has been tempted to draw up historical checklists of the key 
developments that have preceded today's stage or phase of globalization. For instance, 
Roland Robertson (1992) distinguishes five phases. The first phase (1400-1750), witnessed 
the age of European exploration, the global spread of the Roman Catholic Church, the 
emergence of the Westphalian state-system and the advent of modern geography. The second 
phase (1750-1875) saw the consolidation of the state-system based on sovereign nation-states 
in Europe and North America. Relations between sovereign states were increasingly 
structured by international regimes based on diplomatic norms and conventions. The 
Enlightenment and the first stage of industrialization transformed European societies and 
economies alike. European colonialism spread and the first international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) emerged with the foundation of the Red Cross in 1863. In the third 
phase (1875-1925) globalization went through several significant changes. It roughly 
coincided with the beginning of a second industrial revolution -- a revolution in 
communication and transport technology, leading to a significant increase in the volume and 
speed of communications. Steel hulled ships were surpassing sailing vessels in tonnage and 
speed. There was a massive expansion of railroad networks. The period also heralded the 
introduction of the factory system, industrialism and mass production. Other innovations 
included the telegraph, the first transatlantic cable, the introduction of the telephone, the 
widespread use of electricity, the radio and the airplane. Global trade flourished. Phase four 
of globalization (1925-late sixties) witnessed the creation of international regimes and 
institutions with global reach such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
[Footnote 1]. The Bretton Woods system, set up in this phase, was designed to manage the 
global political economy. Contemporary globalization (1969- to date) is distinguished from 
the previous stages by new patterns of migration and the global impact of information and 
communications technologies, which have increased the speed and volume of the circulation 
of goods, capital, services, ideas and people.  
Writers such as Keohane and Nye (2003) argue that while globalisation itself might be 
an old phenomenon, its degree and intensity have varied. They distinguish between ‘thin 
globalization’, such as the time when trade through the Silk Route connected diverse parts of 
the world but affected only a comparatively limited amount of trade and a small number of 
people, and ‘thick globalization’, which has created a dense network of extensive and 
overlapping relationships and an intensification of economic, social, cultural and political 
interdependencies, which is the way globalisation manifests itself today. 
Others see the roots of globalization in antiquity. Stoic philosophy and the idea of the 
cosmopolis, it is argued, were some of the earliest conceptualizations of a community of 
humankind across political and cultural borders. Today, elements of Stoic philosophy can be 
found, for instance, in modern conceptions of universal human rights. Thus, it is argued that 
the idea of links, of certain rights and duties transcending political communities, pre-dates the 
nation-state and the formulation of notions of sovereignty. 
It is probably important here to take a step back and look at the basis of the term 
‘globalization’. While this term itself might have been in use only for the last 45 years, it is 
derived from the words ‘globe’ or ‘global’, which have a much longer history. Both terms 
derive from the Latin ‘globus’, meaning a round body, a sphere, or a ball, and came into 
usage in English in the sixteenth century. However, in English usage, the term ‘global’ was 
used more in the sense of ‘all-inclusive’ or ‘comprehensive’ in the sense of ‘relating to or 
embracing the whole of something, or a group of things’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th 
ed.). 
The meaning of ‘global’ as ‘of or relating to the whole world; worldwide’, is relatively 
new. This was not a term Adam Smith, for instance, had access to; instead he wrote ‘in the 
whole globe of the earth’. The English translator of Marx and Engels’ work 70 years later did 
not have recourse to it either; he was still writing of ‘the whole surface of the globe’ (Sheil 
2001). ‘Global’ as relating to the whole world came into usage only by the end of the 
nineteenth century; no coincidence here that by now the physical discovery and mapping of 
the world was complete. 
In the early 1940s, American military authorities combined the older sense of ‘total’ 
with its newer interpretation as ‘worldwide’ in the concept of ‘global war’ (Sheil 2001). The 
war of the forties now came to be known as World War II, and the Great War of 1914-19 was 
retrospectively re-christened World War I. But the sense of ‘global’ as ‘world encompassing’ 
needed another impetus to enter the wider imagination, and that came with Marshall 
McLuhan’s conception of the ‘global village’ in 1960. The usage of the term since then, has 
conflated the senses of something experienced instantly and simultaneously across the world, 
attracting media attention, and, as if by implication, something very significant or important. 
Other events speeded up the take-up of the term. For instance, ‘global economy’ came into 
use when national controls on international movements of capital and currencies began to be 
relaxed in the mid-1970s.  
The term ‘globalization’ first entered English lexicon through the Webster’s Dictionary 
in 1961, where it was used to describe the interconnectedness of social events and 
relationships (Waters 1995). By and large that definition has not changed. For instance, 
according to the British political theorist David Held’s much-cited definition: 
Globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon, lying on a continuum with ‘the local’ at one end 
and ‘the global’ at the other. It denotes a shift in the spatial form of human organisation and activity to 
transcontinental or interregional patterns of activity, interaction and the exercise of power. […] Globalization 
today implies at least two distinct phenomena. First, it suggests that many chains of political, economic and 
social activity are becoming interregional in scope and, secondly, it suggests that there has been an 
intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between states and societies (Held 
1997: 3). 
Equally quoted today is British sociologist Anthony Giddens’ definition of 
globalization as ‘the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities 
in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and 
vice versa’ (1990: 64). The term entered common parlance following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the collapse of the bipolar world. The first reference to the word in the Oxford 
English Dictionary speaks of its use in the Spectator magazine of October 1962, which had 
declared that ‘globalization is, indeed, a staggering concept’ (Cerami 1962). 
Over time, ‘globalization’ has acquired political meanings and nuances not quite 
captured in that earliest definition of globalization in the Webster’s Dictionary. The most 
dominant strands of thinking around globalization might be discussed in terms of two words, 
both with their roots in the word ‘global’ -- ‘globality’ and ‘globalism’. ‘Globality’ comes 
nearest to the Webster’s Dictionary meaning of globalization. It is a social concept referring 
to the emergence of a global society in the sense that the notion of closed spaces has become 
illusory so that nothing that happens on earth is only a limited local event (Beck 2000). It 
evokes the emergent and contradictory condition of global-ness (Shaw 1999). ‘Globalism’, 
on the other hand, is much more politically charged in that it is endowed with neoliberal 
meanings and values. For advocates of globalism, the ‘world market’ is now powerful 
enough to take the place of (local and national) political action; indeed, it suggests that the 
nation-state is on the verge of becoming a thing of the past. 
Today, the term ‘global’ summons up the planet as a physical entity, but it also hints at 
something more than just the sum of its parts. It suggests a transformation of the spatial 
content of social relations, as it evokes something over and above just the territorial. Indeed, 
its usage today might be said to evoke the self-consciously common framework of human 
society worldwide (Shaw 1999). Thus, quite apart from the physical ‘shrinking’ or 
‘compression’ of the world due to the impact of information and communication technologies 
and improved transport systems, there is also seen to be an enhanced consciousness of the 
world as a whole, of a common global fate, and as such, it is also suggestive of conscious 
global-oriented action.  
It is perhaps this ‘global’ consciousness, and action directed at the ‘global’, which 
makes globalization as we understand it today something ‘new’. This is manifested in our use 
of terms to encompass the whole, such as ‘global economy’ or ‘global factory’, meant to 
convey the worldwide proliferation of activities, where events or actions in one part of the 
world, or changes somewhere along the production chain in one location, can have 
consequences throughout the globe. Thus, globalisation is both, a spread of tangible, physical 
global forces and relations, as Immanuel Wallerstein (1979) would have it, as also the spread 
of an idea, an intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole through the ever-
increasing proliferation of global connections, as Roland Robertson (1992) would argue. 
A number of writings on globalization see it as a set of projects that require us to 
imagine space and time in particular ways. Thus, for David Harvey (1989), the technologies 
of globalization, particularly electronics and telecommunications, together with the ease of 
travel, have rendered it possible to reorganise time such that space is no longer a constraining 
factor, and vice versa. His phrase, ‘time-space compression’, suggests a speeding up of 
economic and social processes which has experientially shrunk the globe so that neither 
distance nor time are any longer major constraints on the organisation of human activity. A 
related but different connotation might be attributed to that other favourite phrase -- ‘time-
space distanciation’. This phrase, coined by Anthony Giddens (1990), suggests the stretching 
of social relations across distances, and reducing their consciousness of their own local status, 
as technologies speed up communications and start to connect distant localities. Here, social 
relations get ‘disembedded’, or lifted out of their local contexts of interaction, to be 
restructured across time and space.  
Amongst the globalization theorists who argue that the extent and pace of globalization 
today is unprecedented are those who see this world as characterized by borderless worlds. 
These are the voices of the ‘hyperglobalizers’, who tom-tom the triumph of the market and 
the death of the nation-state. Let us examine the arguments for seamless global markets and 
the end of the nation-state. 
 
Seamless Global Markets or the March of Western Capitalism? 
 
For hyperglobalizers, the contemporary phase of economic globalization began in 1944, 
when the Bretton Woods system established a new way of managing the international 
economy based on binding rules and a fixed exchange rate system. The Bretton Woods 
agreements also created new international economic institutions to oversee the international 
political economy -- the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This was 
followed in 1947 by the establishment of the predecessor of the contemporary World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The aim of these 
international organisations was to prevent an economic recession that could potentially give 
rise to conflict. 
Social and economic policies espoused at the time followed a welfare state model, 
based, in the widest sense possible, on a Keynesian compromise, which included raising 
wages and assuaging class conflicts, at least temporarily. States could not trust markets to 
always get it right, and hence the need to intervene. However, when the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates ran into problems in the 1960s, and collapsed in the early 
1970s, a prolonged structural crisis of the global economy paved the way for a new economic 
and social order (Duménil and Lévy 2005). Following a decade of inflation, high 
unemployment and low economic growth in the Western world, a more neoliberal approach 
began to replace the Keynesian compromise, as illustrated by the social and economic 
policies ushered in by US President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher (Palley 2005). These policies championed entrepreneurial and individual freedom, 
unregulated and free markets, and private property rights as the best routes to economic 
development and improved human well being (Harvey 2007). 
Meanwhile, the World Bank and the IMF managed to consolidate and enhance their 
weight in international economic affairs in the aftermath of the debt crisis of the developing 
world in the early 1980s. The IMF, in particular, gained a new role with the formulation of 
the so-called Washington Consensus, focusing on market liberalization, fiscal austerity and 
privatization, replacing a critical role for governments with a strong focus on the free market. 
As such it might be said to represent the triumph of economic neoliberalism as the favoured 
paradigm for economic development. In return for much-needed development loans, the IMF 
and the World Bank demanded the implementation of structural adjustment programmes, 
which gave these institutions unprecedented influence over the domestic economic and social 
policies of sovereign nation-states [Footnote 2]. 
Trade liberalisation had long been on the agenda of successive GATT rounds of 
multilateral negotiations, aimed to reduce tariffs on cross-border merchandise trade. Several 
factors converged towards the end of the 1970s to usher in a new phase of globalization as 
the deregulation of interest rates and the removal of credit and capital controls significantly 
increased the transborder flow of capital. An entirely new financial infrastructure began to 
emerge from the 1980s aided by satellite dishes, fibre optic cables and Internet-based 
technologies, and the innovation of new financial products. Large sums of money could now 
be transferred in nanoseconds across the globe. The development of e-businesses and dot.com 
companies are amongst the latest signposts of this new economy. 
A key feature of this phase has been the growing amount of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Indeed, from the 1980s, FDI grew four times faster than world Gross National Product 
(GNP). However, FDI was by no means universally distributed across the globe. It was 
concentrated in developed countries, with significant amounts now also being directed to the 
dynamic emerging economies in East and Southeast Asia and Latin America. The number of 
countries acting as sources of FDI has also diversified considerably, with a number of the 
newly industrialising countries also becoming sources of FDI between 1985 and 2000. 
Today, for instance, Indian and Chinese firms are now said to be starting to give their rich-
world rivals a run for their money. So far in 2007, Indian firms, led by Hindalco and Tata 
Steel, have bought some 34 foreign companies for a combined $10.7 billion. 
Coming into the forefront here were transnational companies (TNCs). Aided by 
technological innovations and financial and trade liberalization, TNCs [Footnote 3] were 
increasingly concentrating control over a large share of global capital, technology and market 
access. They account for about a two-thirds share of world exports of goods and services, 
with a significant share within that held by intra-firm trade. The power held by these large 
corporations, and the transnational, and in some cases global, nature of their operations, has 
enabled them to bypass trade unions, labour laws and to actively influence government 
legislation in both developed and developing countries.  
Throughout this period, and particularly from the late eighties, a neoliberal orthodoxy 
had been taking hold. It was argued that international economic institutions, multinational 
enterprises and transnational activities distributed common values and benefits through the 
spread of market-oriented economic policies, which in turn would encourage more 
democratic and representative governments and human rights. Markets were best given a free 
rein to sort the world out; the state was an inconvenience, it was being argued. If markets 
were allowed to function without undue state intervention, economic globalization would be 
able to unfold its real potential. Milton Friedman (1962), for example, advanced the idea of 
organising society through the mechanisms of private enterprise. Economic activity would be 
decentralized and states would be restricted to providing the legal framework for economic 
activities. In the same vein, Jagdish Bhagwati (2004) sees globalization as the most powerful 
force of social good today, when properly managed. Neoliberal globalization, in this view, is 
a process that increases economic efficiency, individual freedom and overall living standards, 
and alleviates poverty. The many problems faced by the developing world is not the result of 
too much liberalization but too little, it is argued. Protectionism, for instance, is still rampant, 
both in the developing and in the developed world. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
of the European Union (EU) is just one notorious example of how misplaced protectionism 
impedes the chances for developing countries. Thus, neoliberalism in practice often diverges 
widely from neoliberalism in theory, leaving its true potential unrealised (Munck 2005, 
Navarro 2006, Harvey 2007).  
Market liberalisation is perceived as further supporting the spread of human rights and 
democracy throughout the world. Indeed, for some writers, liberal democracy and free market 
capitalism are synonymous terms. In his 1989 essay ‘The End of History’ and in his 1992 
book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama argued that with the end of the 
Cold War, historical progress defined as the quest for human freedom has reached its final 
stage. Communism, the last great ideological challenge to liberal democracy, has failed and 
liberal democracy based on the principles of liberty and equality, together with capitalism as 
the organizing principle, has triumphed. 
 
The Demise of the Nation-State? 
 
For hyperglobalizers, globalization is primarily driven by economic and technological forces 
(Ohmae 1996). As such, hyperglobalizers pronounce the dawn of a ‘borderless world’ and the 
decline of territorial sovereignty as the important reference point for political, economic and 
social organisation. The crumbling nation-state is seen very much as an artefact of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is described as:  
an unnatural, even dysfunctional unit for organizing human activity and managing economic endeavour in a 
borderless world. It presents no genuine, shared community of economic interests; it defines no meaningful 
flows of economic activity. In fact, it overlooks the true linkages and synergies that exist among often 
disparate populations by combining important measures of human activity at the wrong level of analysis … 
On the global economic map the lines that matter now are those defining what might be called ‘region states’ 
(Ohmae 1993: 78) 
States have thus been usurped and/or sidelined by global markets (Strange 1996). Or, as 
Philip Bobbit (2002) contends in his provocative book, The Shield of Achilles, nation-states 
are transforming themselves into market states. Indeed, the only role left for the state is to 
provide a legal framework for the market system to operate effectively. Furthermore, political 
power will be located in ‘global social formations and expressed through networks rather 
than through territorially based states’ (Steger 2003: 61). 
The hyperglobalisers are not without their detractors. The opposition believes that the 
retreat or disappearance of the state has been grossly exaggerated. They highlight the 
importance of politics in unleashing the economic forces that characterize globalization. The 
rapid expansion of economic activity in the last twenty years is not so much the result of the 
‘quasi-natural’ forces of economic activity. Rather, it has been driven by political decisions 
creating a framework for free market economies to flourish, they argue. In particular, the 
neoliberal policies of the United States and Great Britain in the 1970s and 1980s have been 
instrumental in liberalizing international trade and capital flows and in unleashing the forces 
of economic globalization. Or, as Hay (2006) would argue, it was states, after all, that put the 
current neoliberal infrastructure that facilitates globalization in place. And at least the larger, 
wealthier states, or their governments, remain in a position to determine the ‘rules of the 
game’.  
Governmental policies, and not economic activities are, therefore, behind the 
globalization process: 
[G]lobalisation is not the global release of an imminent desire of individuals and businesses to truck, barter 
and exchange, it is rather a neoliberal project, based on a conviction that markets manage resources in a 
superior way to states, but that public institutions are required to impose and maintain those markets 
(Harrison 2004: 154). 
Alan Milward (1993) goes a step further, arguing that the state has actually grown 
stronger as the result of global forces. The pressures of globalization driving European 
integration, for instance, have ironically rescued the state rather than undermining it, by 
allowing it to operate more effectively, he argues. 
Indeed, states still hold enough power to influence their domestic economies (and in 
some cases the global economy) decisively. Among international actors the nation-state will 
remain in a key position, at least for the foreseeable future. There is no apparent alternative 
which could command or enforce the same amount of respect, loyalty and authority and, 
hence, focus and organise social energies in the way governments still can and do by 
appealing to a sense of shared identity (Maull 2000). States are able to restrict and manage 
transnational flows such as international migration through stricter border controls and to 
stifle the flow of capital through the imposition of capital controls. National security 
measures, especially following the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre have further 
enhanced the power of national governments and restricted civil liberties and freedoms. 
Nation-states continue to define, discipline, control and regulate populations, whether these 
are on the move or in residence. 
However, it is important to recognise that the nation-state’s normative character may 
have been challenged: globalization is changing traditional conceptions around the practice of 
national sovereignty. One of the main features of the Westphalian nation-state is an explicit 
connection between sovereignty and territoriality.  
[...] sovereign states rooted in territorial notions of social space have been the prime unit for facilitating, 
impeding and mediating interaction between the social groups, organisations, and citizens and other 
categories of collective and individual social units contained within their borders (Hughes 2000: 5). 
But the Westphalian model might no longer be so relevant. For instance, Jan Aart 
Scholte (1997: 21) argues: 
[…] owing to globalization, the Westphalian system is already past history. The state apparatus survives, and 
indeed is in some respects larger, stronger, and more intrusive in social life than ever before. However, the 
core Westphalian norm of sovereignty is no longer operative; nor can it be retrieved in the present 
globalizing world. The concept of sovereignty continues to be important in political rhetoric, especially for 
people who seek to slow and reverse progressive reductions of national self-determination in the face of 
globalization. However, both juridically and practically, state regulatory capacities have ceased to meet the 
criteria of sovereignty as it was traditionally conceived. 
There has been a reduction in the capacity of national governments to set independent 
national objectives and to impose their own domestic policies. Devolutionary pressures, 
regional integration and international organisations have forced national governments to 
transfer some of their traditional powers and functions, often from the national to the 
municipal and the provincial level. Thus, globalization has resulted in direct trans-border 
links between different sub-state authorities, sometimes in association with central state 
authorities, but also often bypassing them. For instance, ‘global cities’ such as London, 
Tokyo or New York, tend to have very close links with each other. Within Europe, several 
subnational regions are increasingly involved in forging transnational alliances with other 
regions, creating new cross-border regional entities. 
This ‘top-down’ transfer of policy-making power has often also been supplemented by 
a ‘bottom-up’ movement of other state competencies to the international level, evidenced in 
the steady growth in the number and scope of international organizations and 
intergovernmental networks in every part of the world. Examples range from regional 
organizations such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to institutions with a 
global reach such as, for instance, the UN, the IMF, or the World Bank, who must all, 
however, answer to their governing councils, made up of representatives from various states. 
Global governance is also increasingly shaped by the emergence of a ‘global civil 
society’ characterized by numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs) [Footnote 4] 
such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International or Oxfam International. Global civil society 
organizations are distinct from official and commercial structures and include, apart from 
NGOs, consumer protection bodies, academic institutions, environmental campaigns, 
farmer’s associations, trade unions, peace activist groups, human rights advocacy networks 
and more. Taken together, global and regional governance and subnational governance 
structures tend to break the formal institutional framework of the nation-state and exclusive 
national sovereignty, replacing it with a more fluid multi-level governance structure where 
sovereignty is increasingly shared in many areas (Bullman 1997). These dynamics are 
causing many structural changes including a rethinking of the role of national governments 
(Lipsey 1997). Globalization is seen here as leading to a reworking of the nature of national 
sovereignty and national borders. It transforms the organisation of society and opens up new 
political spaces, creating new challenges.  
Theories of hyperglobalization seem to constitute a package built around the premise 
that markets need to be free to function, and that markets will ensure well-being all round. 
For hyperglobalisers, globalisation is new, in that this global economic interconnectedness, 
together with the death of the socialist challenge and the unipolarity thus established are all 
new. Indeed, it is in this context that we must view the arguments by those who would not 
cede that there is something completely ‘new’ about globalization (such as Hirst and 
Thompson 1996 and Hay 2006). By arguing that today's world market is not unprecedented, 
they are able to defend certain political responses to globalization -- such as European social 
democracy -- as still viable; options that hyperglobalizers (and neoliberals) have already 
banished into history as things of the past. It is also in this context that we must understand 
Hirst and Thompson’s (1999: 6) words, that globalization is ‘a myth suitable for a world 
without illusions, but it is also one that robs us of hope .... for it is held that Western social 
democracy and socialism of the Soviet bloc are both finished. One can only call the political 
impact of “globalization” the pathology of over-diminished expectations’.  
 
The Challenges of Deterritorialisation 
 
The increasing movement and operation of people, goods, businesses and services in markets 
beyond national borders are said to have led to the erosion of any ‘natural’ relation of a 
culture with a geographical and social territory. The deregulation and liberalization of 
markets has immensely contributed to this process of deterritorialisation. Sovereign national 
states are now ‘criss-crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects 
of power, orientations, identities and networks’ (Beck 2000: 11). As such, any ‘natural’ 
relation of a culture or process with a geographical and social territory is sundered, and the 
connections between cultural structures, relationships, settings and representations are torn 
apart. While there are those who hark for an older world and bemoan deterritorialization, it 
also creates new opportunities. For instance, it creates new markets for businesses that thrive 
on the need of deterritorialized populations to keep in touch with ‘home’. Thus, both 
deterritorialisation and greater connectedness are consequences of globalization. 
However, this deterritorialization of culture is not seen by all as a benign matter. Fears 
around deterritorialization stem from the fear of cultural imperialism -- a fear that the world 
is being made over in the image of the West, spreading a shallow, ‘inauthentic’ homogeneity 
and uniformity throughout the world. The use of English as the global medium of 
communication is thought to ensure the global transmission of Western-style consumerism. 
The influence and reach of Western media and entertainment industries (like CNN and Time 
Warner), and the values they espouse, are seen to be encroaching on and destroying the 
variety of traditions in the world in insidious ways, primarily by spreading, and validating as 
superior, Western ways of seeing and knowing.  
This purportedly homogenising and universalising trend is seen to be creating a ‘global 
culture’, slowly obliterating and replacing local and regional cultural practices. Westernised/ 
largely Americanised culture in the form of pop music and Hollywood blockbusters is seen to 
have created a global culture that binds together young people of different national, linguistic 
and cultural backgrounds. According to this view, global culture is directly related to the 
restructuring of the global political economy, in particular to the spread of capitalism.  
Indeed, the outcome of economic globalisation is portrayed as being both negative and 
limited, largely benefiting the developed world and already powerful TNCs, and leading to 
‘corporate globalization’ or ‘globalization-from-above’ (Steger 2003). This proliferation of 
global capitalism is seen as a form of neo-colonialism, undermining the political, social and 
economic fabric of many societies, making them vulnerable to the volatility of markets, 
systematically destroying the environment, endangering the rights of minorities and, 
ultimately, rendering ineffective democratic principles. Globalization, from this perspective, 
is another name for Westernization, and the systematic exploitation of the Global South by 
Western capitalism. [Footnote 5]. 
The term ‘McDonaldisation’ is used to capture the process of the dissemination of 
Western consumerism. According to Ritzer, who coined the term, it is ‘the process by which 
the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of 
American society as well as of the rest of the world’ (1993: 1). The term also evokes the 
ubiquity of brands, industrial giants and entertainment icons such as Coca Cola, Disney, 
Benetton, Unilever, BP, BASF, Shell, Nike, Adidas, Hollywood or Levi’s, all of which shape 
desires, create new needs, establish brand awareness and contribute to capital accumulation.  
The fears of a homogenizing global culture have, however, been criticised as being 
largely unfounded. They are seen to be built upon rather simplistic constructions of Third 
World subjects as passive consumers of the West’s exports, rather than actors who creatively 
engage with these cultural forms, interpreting and adapting them to local circumstances, or 
sometimes simply rejecting them. Roland Robertson (1992), for instance, points to a much 
more complex local/ global connection (glocalisation). It would be far too simplistic to 
reduce the relationship between global and local culture to a one-dimensional one of 
domination and subordination. First, while global culture might be dominated by Western 
ideas, global cultural flows are always interpreted in local contexts. Imported commodities 
are often indigenised in order to cater to local tastes. McDonald’s, for instance, adopts its 
menu to suit local tastes. Similarly, non-Western cultures localise Western cultural 
influences. Indian women, for example, may change between wearing a traditional saree and 
Western style clothing according to occasion and context. As Anna Tsing (2001) argues, 
there has been a tendency to naturalise the notion of a global culture, with very little 
exploration of the possibility that different manifestations of capitalism and governmentality 
are themselves born of particular contexts, are culturally circumscribed, and are often 
contradictory. While the homogenising tendencies are certainly very powerful, they do not 
necessarily extinguish cultural differences. 
Second, cultural flows are by no means uni-directional, from West to East or from the 
Global North to the Global South. As diverse and remote cultures become accessible, both as 
signs and as commodities, the flows move in both directions as well. Indeed, a 
deterritorialized world is said to have engendered a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ uniting the 
cultural, financial and political flows within and between western and non-western countries 
into a single conceptual whole. And third, Westernisation invites a reaction when advocates 
of marginalized cultures feel their identity being threatened. Benjamin Barber (1996) points 
out that the colonising and imperialistic tendencies of ‘McWorld’ provoke cultural and 
political resistance in the form of ‘Jihad’. This finds its expression in the efforts of 
fundamentalist orthodoxy in the Third World and in xenophobia and right wing nationalism 
in many developed countries. Other expressions of resistance against these homogenizing 
forces may take the form of the ban on satellite dishes in some Middle Eastern countries or 
the censorship of the Internet in China. 
Cultural imperialism theorists also fail to consider circuits of culture that bypass the 
West. This could take various forms, such as the movement of capital into China from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong or Southeast Asia. Or it could be a cultural influence -- while CNN and 
Time Warner might boast an extensive reach, there is no gainsaying the hold Bollywood has 
on large parts of Asia, the Middle East and even Africa, or the triumph of Cantopop in the 
West. 
Deterritorialization has been accompanied by other changes. The very notion of 
citizenship, for example, conventionally based on political rights and participation within a 
sovereign state, is now understood differently. Arjun Appadurai (1996), for instance, argues 
that diaspora populations around the world comprise emerging ‘post-nations’ that 
deterritorialize states. Transnational ties, and their legalisation through, for instance, dual 
citizenship regimes, are seen to raise new challenges for the construction of national identities 
and processes of decision-making. At the same time, managers, technocrats, and 
professionals on the move often seek to both circumvent and benefit from different nation-
state regimes by selecting different sites for investment, work and family relocation. The term 
‘flexible citizenship’ is often used to capture both these strategies and the effects of such 
manoeuvres (see, for instance, Ong 1998, 2006). As such, globalization is seen to have made 
economic calculation a major element in diasporic subjects’ choice of citizenship, as well as 
in the ways in which nation-states redefine immigration laws. 
A number of writers on global governance maintain that globalization will facilitate the 
emergence of a transnational cosmopolitan democracy where rights and obligations become 
detached from national and, ultimately, territorial contexts. Such a cosmopolitan model of 
democracy requires the creation of regional (or global) parliaments connected to states, 
regions and localities; the extension of the authority of regional bodies such as the EU; the 
setting-up of a new International Court of Human Rights which entrenches a new charter of 
rights and duties in different national parliaments, the separation of political and economic 
interests and a working global legal system including effective enforcement mechanisms (see, 
for instance, Archibugi and Held 1995, Kaldor 2003 a and b, Held 1995, and Archibugi et al 
1998). 
Deterritorialisation has led to new ways of conceptualising relations in the world. The 
centre-periphery model, set out by Frobel, Heinrichs and Kreye in their work on the 
international division of labour (1980) and Wallerstein’s world systems theory (1979), and 
variations on that theme, had for long defined the contours for the discussion on relations 
between different parts of the globe. The newer notion is that of flows or circulation, evoking 
very different images, and a profoundly different understanding of globalisation. While flows 
or circulation conjures up images of markets and trade, it might equally suggest the breaking 
down of barriers among cultures, races and nations. Appadurai’s ‘scapes’ (1996), for 
instance, exemplifies this new imagery –ethnoscapes, the landscape of persons who constitute 
the shifting world in which people live; technoscapes, the global configuration of 
technologies moving at high speeds across previously impermeable borders; financescapes, 
the global grid of currency speculation and capital transfer; mediascapes, the distribution of 
the capabilities to produce and disseminate information and the large complex repertoire of 
images and narratives generated by these capabilities; and ideoscapes, ideologies of states 
and counter-ideologies of movements, around which nation-states have organized their 
political cultures. For Appadurai (1996), the movements of people are increasingly making it 
difficult to neatly distinguish between core and periphery or here and there as the core gets 
‘peripheralised’ with the reverse traffic in people and culture setting itself up at the heart of 
the west. 
Meanwhile, a new entity that has entered discussions of deterritorialisation is 
cyberspace, a simulated space spawned by computers and online networks. It has become a 
site that holds the potential to simulate innumerable spaces of action, with its own agendas, 
interests and values, which are beyond the containment of the nation-state. It has become a 
‘new imaginary location of escape, promise and profit’ (Eisenstein 1998). Time too is 
transfigured here, shifting away from the linearity of past-present-future, ‘becoming either a 
static, frozen moment that breaks time down into discrete instances, or an automatic, 
continuous flow, similar to a video monitor with its screen switched on and waiting for an 
event to happen’ (Boyer 1996). 
Several countries have made attempts to secure, regulate or even ‘handcuff’ 
cyberspace, and bring it in line with national laws and concerns (including the US 
government’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace in February 2003). China and Saudi 
Arabia are examples of two countries that have placed significant restrictions on their 
citizens’ access to parts of cyberspace. There are also efforts to start a global dialogue to 
effect comprehensive and harmonised laws in this domain. 
 
Conclusion: Is Globalisation – ‘Good’ or ‘Bad’? 
 
As we have seen, the concept of globalization can be approached from various different 
directions. It is a highly contested concept and the standpoint one takes depends ultimately on 
one’s ideological disposition. It concerns questions of governance, as also with the 
distribution of wealth and resources, and it tends to often pitch ‘tradition’ against new 
symbols and images ‘imported’ in, primarily through the media. Although some authors 
present globalization as a largely apolitical process, almost everything related to it is political 
in one way or another. Indeed, as we have seen, claims to its neutrality are value-laden in 
themselves, and represent a particular position of interest in the contemporary global political 
economy. 
It should come as no surprise then that the most vocal proponents of neoliberal 
globalization as a force for social, political and economic progress have been stakeholders in 
the contemporary global political economy. Support is evident in the neoliberal policies of 
many international organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF or the WTO but also in 
the foreign and domestic policies of the G8 countries. Other advocates include the chief 
executives of large transnational enterprises, corporate managers, corporate lobbyists, 
investment banks and large insurance companies, as also journalists and academics, 
bureaucrats and politicians, propagating the merits of free market capitalism and 
consumerism, all suggesting that the distribution of wealth and power is central to one’s 
position in the whole globalization discourse. 
While there may be increased opportunities for the movement of people, goods, 
businesses and services in markets beyond national borders, and transnational diaspora are 
producing conditions for new hybridised cultures and identities, this is hardly weakening 
existing relations of power or in any way threatening Western hegemony. Indeed, there is 
increasing ‘inter-culturalism’ (as opposed to multiculturalism), including processes of both 
‘dis-integration’ and ‘re-integration’ at both the state and global levels. There are processes of 
homogenization or integration such as, for instance, unifying commodity and consumer 
cultures such as Coca Cola, the Big Mac, Dallas or Lost, while processes of differentiation or 
fragmentation could take the form of ethnic resilience, fragmentation and the re-emergence of 
powerful nationalist sentiments associated with the myths, memories and symbols of local 
places rather than global spaces. 
Moreover, the movement of people is still restricted, with better-off states and 
economies fast developing a siege mentality, nervous about large-scale immigration from 
poorer parts of the world. A security dimension has now been added to these concerns since 
the events of 9/11, taking fear to new dimensions.  
Neoliberal globalisation, it is argued, has subordinated both nature and social values to 
the drive for economic growth. The increase in international trade and the liberalisation of 
markets has environmental implications as it promotes unsustainable patterns of production 
and consumption and potentially hastens an overall lowering of environmental regulations 
and standards (race-to-the-bottom). Anthropocentric notions are deeply enshrined in the 
current neoliberal globalization discourse. Industrial development, unrestrained consumption 
and population growth have placed an unprecedented strain on natural resources and 
atmospheric conditions, resulting in large-scale pollution of rivers and oceans, deforestation 
and desertification. However, we are also very conscious of the conditions we are creating. 
We live in what Ulrich Beck calls a ‘risk society’, reflexively aware of the damages we 
ourselves are causing the environment, such as the loss of biodiversity and global warming, 
and aware of the imminent threat these pose to life not just locally, but across the globe. Yet, 
concerted political will to effect change has been lacking. The US, the largest producer of 
carbon emissions, for instance, has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. And despite large 
commitments of funds from the EU and other sources, without US participation, and with no 
clear enforcement mechanism, it is unclear how effective this treaty will be. 
Neoliberal globalization is seen to be generating new inequalities while exacerbating 
the gap between the richest and the poorest: 
[It] reinforces patterns of global exclusion and disempowerment while also making globalization ethically, if 
not politically, unsustainable. … This architecture, which divides humanity into elites, the bourgeoisie, the 
marginalized and the impoverished, cut across territorial and cultural boundaries, rearranging the world into 
the winners and the losers of globalization (Held and McGrew 2002: 81). 
It would be a mistake, however, to believe that globalization sceptics represent a united 
front. Indeed, there are arguments from many different quarters that point to the negative 
sides of contemporary globalisation. Samuel Huntington’s foreboding concerning a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ in the post-Cold War world is relevant in this context since it predicts violent 
conflict around the politics of religion, culture and identity (Huntington 1993).  
The ideological opposition to globalism comes from the left and the right of the 
political spectrum. On the right are particularist protectionists, critics who blame neoliberal 
globalisation for many of the economic and social problems faced by national societies. They 
are motivated by a fear of reduced living standards, a loss of national identity and culture due 
to unwanted foreign influences and the loss of national sovereignty. Proponents of this view 
denounce free trade agendas, the power of transnational companies and international 
institutions, the perceived ‘Americanisation’ of national cultures and the general permeability 
of national borders to transnational influences. On the left is the so-called ‘anti-globalization 
movement’, a group of loosely organised universalist-protectionist networks challenging 
neoliberal globalism. Sporadic anti-globalization struggles occurred throughout the 1990s in 
the developing world. A significant event was the 1994 Zapatista uprising in the Mexican 
state of Chiapas when the constitution was amended following the ratification of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect on 1 January 1994, abolishing 
their communal land rights and opening the economy to market forces. However, a large-
scale confrontation between supporters of globalism and its challengers did not erupt until  
the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999, when an alliance of human rights groups, trade unions, 
labour groups, environmentalists, animal rights activists, consumer rights proponents, 
feminists, advocates of Third World development and debt relief gathered in Seattle to raise 
their voices against the WTO, free-market capitalism and corporate globalisation.  
The term ‘anti-globalisation’, however, does not quite capture the spirit of this 
movement. Most protestors are not against globalization as such but against a neoliberal 
vision of globalization. They actively voice their support for a bottom-up form of 
globalization where democracy, labour rights and environmental standards would not be 
marginalized by the market. Furthermore, campaigners employ the technologies that 
characterise globalization with great efficiency and effect. Indeed, modern communications 
such as the Internet, mobile phones and laptop computers have made the global coordination 
of protest possible. Several commentators, such as Noam Chomsky, have therefore suggested 
that ‘global justice movement’ or ‘global social movement’ may be more appropriate names. 
There have also been several regional and local movements that might be termed ‘anti-
globalization’. Though varying widely in their aims and political complexions, they share a 
common sense of injustice. While challenging processes whose origins lie beyond their 
immediate localities, they profess the aim of establishing greater control over their own lives 
and spaces.  
It appears then that globalization remains a controversial and highly contested term. 
Given such a wealth of differing opinions, almost everything related to globalization let alone 
the definition of the concept, or its social, political, economic and cultural implications, is 
notoriously difficult to pin down. The aim of this short introduction has been to introduce the 
reader to some of the literatures at the centre of the debate, and provide a framework for the 
rest of the volume.  
 
 
